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The position of place in governing global problems: a mechanistic account of place-1 
as-context, and analysis of transitions towards spatially explicit approaches to 2 
climate science and policy 3 
1. Introduction: place, causal mechanisms, and sustainability  4 
Place is a central concept within many traditions of sustainability science (Kates et al., 2001). The 5 
rough idea is that whilst many modern environmental and development problems are in some 6 
senses global in character, they are nevertheless the products of diverse actions that are highly 7 
contextual, exert their impacts through causal chains that are heterogeneous across space in form 8 
and effect, and require policy responses that take account of this variety and complexity (e.g. Lejano 9 
and Ingram, 2007; Scott, 1998). As such, many sustainability scientists restrict their methodological 10 
focus to relatively micro-level analysis (place as location), on the grounds that this is the most 11 
practical scale for uncovering the heterogeneous causal mechanisms at play (e.g. Wilbanks and 12 
Kates, 1999), for eliciting local knowledge, and for designing effective interventions. Yet the concept 13 
of place within sustainability science remains somewhat under-developed. In particular, its (uneasy) 14 
relationship to abstraction and generalisation remains unclear, and there are unresolved 15 
methodological problems surrounding how to address interactions across places and spatial scales 16 
(Liu et al., 2013a). This slightly paradoxical situation – where place is both a central concept of 17 
sustainability science, and also a rather under-theorised and unclarified notion – is mirrored in many 18 
other academic disciplines (Casey, 2013).1  19 
For example, Aristotle developed a theory of the causal agencies that places possess by virtue of 20 
their locatedness, heterogeneity, and multi-dimensionality (Morison, 2002; Casey, 2013), and more 21 
recently phenomenologists have addressed what it means to be in place (Heidegger, 1971). 22 
However, in the intervening millennia place rather fell out of use as a philosophical concept, being 23 
replaced by a preoccupation with absolute and unbounded space (Casey, 1996, 2013). Sociologists, 24 
meanwhile, have always been interested in types of places – the home, the workplace, the prison – 25 
although often without taking a spatially explicit focus. Indeed the late 20th Century saw many social 26 
theorists argue that revolutions in communications and transportation had transcended place 27 
(Coleman, 1993) or rendered it “phantasmagoric” (Giddens, 1990), by removing the drag imposed by 28 
location and distance on human interaction (Gieryn, 2000). However, more empirically minded 29 
sociologists have continued to focus on the highly contextual and spatially patterned nature of social 30 
processes (Gieryn, 2000), from both interpretive and mechanistic perspectives (e.g. Sampson, 2012). 31 
Statisticians do not speak much of place per se, but have always been concerned with external 32 
validity – the question of whether inferences drawn from a particular study can be generalised to 33 
contexts that differ in terms of environmental features or populations (e.g. Cox, 1958). On the other 34 
hand, the natural and physical sciences have historically focussed on the discovery of laws, i.e. fixed 35 
and invariant regularities (Cartwright, 1989, 1999). Here, context or place-effects are broadly seen as 36 
confounders or sources of variance to be screened out or adjusted for (Guala, 2003), so as to isolate 37 
the general principles or equations that govern relations between objects. However, this sits 38 
alongside an awareness that there is often a significant amount of knowledge of local conditions 39 
required to predict the implications of general laws. More controversially, scholars from “science 40 
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studies” have problematized context-free accounts of scientific knowledge production (Collins, 1981; 1 
Ophir and Shapin, 1991), focussing on how social and cultural environments shape the production of 2 
scientific facts, and on the labour intensive activities (e.g. standardisation, the construction of 3 
physical and social networks, etc.) required to make facts travel across place and scale (Powell, 4 
2007). 5 
Place, in short, plays an important though contested role in how many disciplines conceive of and 6 
study the world, although the term (or cognate concepts) is defined and deployed in quite differing 7 
ways. To an extent, this is unavoidable, given the widely varying epistemological and methodological 8 
commitments held by interpretive sociologists compared to, say, statisticians, and it would be 9 
somewhat ironic if place as a concept turned out to have universal features. So on the one hand, this 10 
interpretive flexibility is quite natural and useful, but on the other it may limit theoretical 11 
development and the cross-fertilisation of ideas across disciplines. This paper seeks to address this 12 
problem, through developing a conceptualisation of place broad enough to accommodate many of 13 
these distinct epistemological and methodological commitments, and then deploying it in a case 14 
study that draws, in a targeted fashion, on the published literature on climate science and policy 15 
making. Our research aims are to: 16 
1) Develop a mechanistic account of place that focuses on the relationship between causal 17 
processes and particular contexts;  18 
We then deploy our mechanistic account to: 19 
2) Trace the historical roots of spatially blind approaches to governing global problems to the 20 
logics of modernity, necessarily in a schematic fashion;  21 
3) Highlight the neglect of place in in the early years of climate change science and policy, 22 
which we implicate in the difficulties faced in engaging publics, informing decision-making, 23 
and in reducing emissions; and  24 
4) Account for recent transitions towards more spatially explicit approaches to climate change 25 
science and policy making. 26 
 27 
1.1. Conceptual framework: a mechanistic account of place-as-context 28 
Here we introduce our conceptualisation of place as the fundamental context in which social and 29 
environmental mechanisms operate, drawing on the ideas of Sampson (2012, 2013) and Cartwright 30 
(1999). Our focus is orthogonal to the humanistic accounts of place which focus on interpretative 31 
(e.g. sense of place) or phenomenological aspects (e.g. being in place) (see Casey, 1996). Our 32 
conceptualisation can best be understood by contrasting it with the Galilean ontology, which views 33 
causal mechanisms as producing universal and fixed effects independent of context (Cartwright, 34 
1999). From the Galilean perspective, place is a mere stage in which the laws of the social and 35 
natural world play out. The place-as-fundamental-context ontology (Sampson, 2012, 2013; 36 
Cartwright and Pemberton, 2013; Cartwright, 1999), by contrast, views causal mechanisms as often 37 
being sharply bounded in scope (rather than operating universally), and sees their form, operation, 38 
and effects as variable (heterogeneous) and context-dependent. Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) 39 
class this as reflecting an Aristotelian ontology, wherein place is an active ingredient in constituting 40 
and shaping social and environmental mechanisms. These different ontological positions lead to 41 
quite different ways of learning about the world (methodology), as well as distinct approaches to 42 
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intervening in the world (e.g. policy-making or technology design and implementation). Causal 1 
mechanisms are the chains through which causes bring about effects; they are relationships that can 2 
be exploited for the purposes of manipulation or control (Pearl, 2000). A causal mechanism might 3 
refer to something in the natural or physical world (e.g. the causal chains through which 4 
atmospheric CO2 levels influence local climate conditions), or to human interventions in the world 5 
(e.g. the process through which a mitigation policy brings about change in anthropogenic emissions). 6 
These mechanisms may not necessarily be independent of place or time, and so are distinct from the 7 
classical philosophical conception of laws (Fetzer, 2014). In broad terms, context can be understood 8 
as those spatially variable features of the world that determine whether, how, and to what extent a 9 
causal mechanism will operate and exert its effect. In our view, context cannot be defined a priori, as 10 
the relevant dimensions of context will depend on the particular mechanism and intervention being 11 
considered. As an example, for a government planner considering the introduction of new 12 
agricultural tools or machinery in order to improve food production, then context might refer to 13 
place-specific working practices, soil conditions, infrastructure, gender-roles, and climatic conditions. 14 
As a further clarification, a focus on place does not necessarily presuppose a localist approach, as the 15 
relevant scale(s) at which to consider context will be sensitive to the research and policy questions 16 
of interest. With this account, place-blind approaches to knowledge creation and policy making 17 
differ from those that are place-sensitive along various dimensions: universal vs. particular; law-like 18 
vs. geographically bounded; homogenous vs. heterogeneous; uniform vs. context-sensitive; and 19 
idealised vs. holistic.  20 
The remainder of the paper is split into two main sections. The first is a stylised and relatively 21 
informal account of the origins of global risk governance (Hulme, 2010; Escobar, 1994), where we 22 
suggest that an emphasis on abstract, global, and universal principles of problem solving can be 23 
traced back to modernist ideals. We then focus on the case of climate change, beginning by using 24 
our mechanistic account of place-as-context to unpack the implications of the idealised and highly 25 
aggregated nature of early generation general circulation and integrated assessment models (e.g. 26 
the reduction of climate change to changes in global mean temperature; the use of a single utility 27 
function to represent global welfare, etc.). We next suggest that this relative neglect of place was 28 
mirrored in early global framings of the anthropogenic drivers of climate change and of the 29 
appropriate scale and nature of institutional responses (c.f. Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2010; Demeritt, 30 
2001). We then implicate this framing in the limited progress in tackling climate change in both 31 
public and policy spheres. We next turn to trace out recent shifts towards more spatially explicit 32 
approaches to climate change science. These shifts reflect a move towards an Aristotelian ontology 33 
which acknowledges that even where causal drivers are in a sense global in nature (e.g. atmospheric 34 
levels of greenhouse gases), their impacts are often mediated through variables that are spatially 35 
clustered at multiple scales, moderated by contextual features of the local environment, and 36 
interact with the presence of other (localised) stressors in synergistic rather than additive ways. We 37 
then reflect on the recent spatialisation of climate change mitigation, manifest in policy discourses 38 
and practices that emphasise spatial planning and local autonomy, appeal to heterogeneous 39 
worldviews and interests, and that emphasise the value of experimenting with various mitigation 40 
strategies across multiple scales and locations. We conclude that a focus on place, heterogeneity, 41 
and context can maximise (rather than limit) the policy-relevance of climate science and help to 42 
ensure the development of policy interventions that are robust and effective.  43 
2. Place-neglect in historical perspective: from the mastery of nature to the global risk society 44 
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Spatially-insensitive approaches to sustainability governance can be traced back to what social 1 
theorists class as the logics of modernity, which envision a world of rational social and political 2 
organisation, where science controls nature, and technology secures abundant resources (Norgaard, 3 
1994; Habermas and Ben-Habib, 1981; Leiss, 1974; Hedrén and Linnér, 2009). Here, humans were no 4 
longer to be at the mercy of fate, but would instead be able to navigate their way through possible 5 
futures, drawing on the relentless growth of science and technology to exploit nature in pursuit of 6 
social and economic progress (White, 1967; Leiss, 1974; Giddens, 1990). The modernist project 7 
reflected a normative vision that emphasised: the role of logic, a particular conception of scientific 8 
method, widespread technological development, and expert government (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 9 
1992; Habermas, 1975). In other words, it was premised on an approach to reasoning about and 10 
intervening in the world that was abstract, global, and homogeneous, rather than place-sensitive, 11 
contingent, or spatially variable. For example, logic refers to the set of context-free universal rules 12 
for deriving conclusions from premises, one of the defining features of which is that the content or 13 
domain of the problem is irrelevant to what constitutes a valid argument (Skyrms, 2000). The 14 
scientific method, on the conventional Galilean account, refers to the systematic methods and 15 
principles for deriving exact and general laws relating to the natural, physical and social worlds 16 
(Cartwright, 1999; Ophir and Shapin, 1991). On this view, science’s methods of inquiry (e.g. relating 17 
to isolation, idealisation and control) and the knowledge that it produces transcend place in a similar 18 
manner to logical truths (Ophir and Shapin, 1991). This context-independent knowledge then 19 
informs the design of globally-applicable technologies2 that can manipulate regularities in welfare-20 
enhancing ways, ranging from agricultural innovations that exploit relationships between input 21 
factors and yield, to an approach to social engineering that conceives of society as composed of 22 
stable and hence governable classifications of people sharing regular traits, characteristics, and 23 
values (Foucault, 1991; Scott, 1998). Here, heterogeneity in contexts – such as variations in soils, 24 
climate, work habits and institutions in the domain of agricultural development – were typically 25 
treated as irrelevances to the goal of circulating global technologies (Scott, 1998). Finally, expert 26 
government is the idea that the global truths of logic and science should provide the evidence that 27 
shapes the governance of public life, rather than (contextually-bound) practical reason, emotions, or 28 
local interests. 29 
This system of thinking reached its peak during the later stages of the Industrial Revolution, by which 30 
time technological advances had led to dramatic economic and social changes throughout the major 31 
colonial powers. However, this sense of progress was perturbed in the mid-20th Century, which 32 
marked the growing recognition of the variety of ways that humans – via technology – were 33 
degrading the natural environment (Beck, 1992). These side-effects of technological progress soon 34 
entered public and political consciousness, leading to the rise of the “regulatory state” (Sunstein, 35 
1990), namely the body of laws, regulations, and incentive structures that seek to constrain 36 
industrial activities to safeguard public and environmental health. Under this approach, scientific 37 
and technological progress was accepted as carrying with it its own set of problems, conceived of as 38 
relatively localised “externalities” (Kysar, 2010). Although these externalities were “global” problems 39 
in the sense that they were found in many nations, their manifestation was geographically bounded 40 
(e.g. a polluted lake), and their origins were often traced to context-specific failings (e.g. poor 41 
operating or maintenance practices in a nearby industrial plant).  For example, they were typically 42 
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tackled by regulatory regimes charged with focussing on particular risk objects or technologies, 1 
following an approach that paid limited attention to interactions across domains (e.g. the 2 
unintended side-effects of regulatory interventions), across places (e.g. the shifting of harms across 3 
jurisdictional boundaries), or across scales (Wiener and Graham, 2009; Sunstein, 1990). However, 4 
the tenability of this approach was challenged by the emergence of the global-scale ecological 5 
threats such as ozone depletion, acid rain, the “population bomb,” and climate change (Beck, 1992).  6 
A new category of risks had emerged: their causes and consequences were not limited to a particular 7 
location or place; they were of our own making, yet also paradoxically it was unclear whose 8 
responsibility they were; and they were deeply challenging to calculate, given their unprecedented 9 
nature and lack of time series data (Beck, 1992). 10 
Experts and politicians began to speak in terms of “global problems,” partly inspired by the 1970s 11 
Club of Rome reports, and it became fashionable to think of Earth as a global system, made up of 12 
interconnected parts, processes, and mechanisms (Sachs, 1988). A key idea here was that the harms 13 
associated with technology were of a grander scale than previously thought, and moreover, were 14 
tightly enmeshed with the very fabric of economic, social, and political systems. These systemic 15 
harms threatened to elide the capacities of the rather fragmented regulatory state. The discourse on 16 
the “ecological crisis” became increasingly apocalyptic, with governance now seemingly required on 17 
a planetary scale (Escobar, 1994). That the modernist project was facing difficulty did not, however, 18 
lead to the revision of its central premises. Instead, the repair program that emerged – the planetary 19 
governance that Escobar (1994) spoke of – retained those central modernist commitments in its 20 
early stages. It was modelled on purposive rationality: the idea that abstract knowledge, once 21 
passed on to expert decision makers, can resolve or control problems, this time on a global scale 22 
(Habermas, 1984; Hulme, 2012; Prins et al., 2010). In the following section, we suggest that certain 23 
aspects of these modernist instincts – in particular a lack of attention to issues of place, 24 
heterogeneity, and context in both scientific and policy practices – undermined early efforts to 25 
tackle climate change, before tracing out shifts towards more spatially explicit approaches to climate 26 
science and mitigation. The transition has been gradual rather than marked by a sharp discontinuity, 27 
although we split our analysis into sections for purposes of exposition. 28 
3. Case study of the history of climate change governance and its more recent evolution 29 
3.1. The early years: climate change as a place-less phenomenon 30 
The early stages of climate change science focused on clarifying the anthropogenic signature of 31 
warming and forecasting changes in global mean climate under plausible emission scenarios (Spash, 32 
2002). This involved a large element of formal modelling – both of future climate scenarios and 33 
historic trends – in particular via the construction and running of general circulation models (GCMs). 34 
It is often remarked that GCMs involve a great deal of abstraction and simplification (e.g. Taylor, 35 
1997; Demeritt, 2001; Hulme, 2008). However, this is an inevitable aspect of modelling – models by 36 
their very nature cannot capture all dimensions of the systems that they seek to represent. As such, 37 
the relevant question becomes: what is being left out of these models, and with what implications? 38 
The Galilean perspective is useful in shedding light on this. GCMs are Galilean in two broad senses: 39 
they are strongly idealised models, and they draw much of their “epistemic authority” (Hulme, 2013) 40 
from being rooted in universal properties and relationships. In the first sense, early generation GCMs 41 
abstract or reduce climate change – a multi-dimensional causal capacity – to changes in (global) 42 
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mean temperature (the major output variable). More on this later. In the second sense, GCMs 1 
contain entities whose properties are fixed and universal (e.g. the radiative properties of CO2); 2 
physical laws that are similarly context-independent (e.g. the Navier-Stokes equations); and 3 
processes that are properly understood as operating at a global scale (e.g. atmospheric dispersion 4 
means that the impacts of emissions on climate are independent of their source of origin) (Hulme, 5 
2010). To be clear, that a modelling approach draws heavily on universal, abstract knowledge does 6 
not necessarily imply that it fails to represent or encode geographic or spatial detail (e.g. the states 7 
of the world that serve as model inputs may be geographically patterned). However, a long standing 8 
criticism of early generation GCMs – from the impact modelling community and policy makers –has 9 
focussed on both their coarse scale and on their incomplete representation of the physical processes 10 
that will govern local and regional (rather than global) climatic change (Mearns et al., 2001). In the 11 
first regard, GCMs typically resolve on grid squares spanning hundreds of kilometres, with sub-scale 12 
variability in underlying processes represented by proxy if at all (e.g. various methods of 13 
parameterisation). Secondly, there have been long-standing difficulties in representing certain meso 14 
and micro level processes (e.g. the El Niño-Southern Oscillation; local weather systems that govern 15 
heat and moisture transfer) and land surface features (e.g. land use, topography) that are expected 16 
to mediate global-regional climate changes (Christensen et al., 2013).  17 
This aforementioned lack of spatial detail and coarse scale of GCMs served as major constraint to 18 
impacts modelling (Cash and Moser, 2000), which typically operates at far finer resolutions given the 19 
context-sensitivity of the mechanisms through which impacts arise (e.g. mechanistic ecological 20 
models used to simulate climate impacts operate over scales ranging from a single plant to several 21 
hectares; Mearns et al., 2001). Various regionalisation techniques which seek to bridge this scalar 22 
mismatch had been used at the pilot stage and beyond by the late 1990s, but the understanding of 23 
the geographical details of local impacts was still characterised as “patchy” by the time of AR3 24 
(Smith et al., 2001).  A prominent workaround for this was to focus on aggregate impact analyses 25 
(ibid.). Informally, the idea here was to increase precision by extending the scale of analysis to that 26 
of the globe, in the hope that the model errors of local impact studies would be averaged out. In 27 
practice, this global picture relied on analyses undertaken primarily in the developed world for their 28 
inputs, with adjustments to account for differences in regional circumstances (e.g. geographical 29 
features, adaptive capacity, extent to which economy is climate-sensitive, etc.) undertaken to 30 
varying degrees of care (Smith et al., 2001).  31 
An example of the above approach is the first generation global Integrated Assessment Models 32 
(IAMs), which tied together economics, the carbon cycle, climate science, and impacts within highly 33 
aggregated models that allow for cost-benefit evaluations of various climate policy options 34 
(Nordhaus and Boyer, 2003; Stern, 2006). These models – which were drawn on in AR3 – typically 35 
focused on snapshot increases in global mean temperature; used a single utility function to 36 
represent global welfare; adopted a fixed equation to relate economic damages to temperature 37 
changes; and used global GDP or aggregate consumption as their primary output measure (Stern, 38 
2006; Smith et al., 2001). In other words, these IAMs were strongly reflective of an ontology that 39 
views climate change as a singular causal capacity that exerts a fixed effect that is best understood 40 
at the global scale. This ontology is problematic not solely because of the rather heroic assumptions 41 
required to make it operational (e.g. in the selection of the form of the damage function), but also 42 
because the reduction of climate change to a singular causal capacity (mean temperature change) 43 
that exerts a stable, context-independent effect leads to a systematic underestimate of impacts. This 44 
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underestimation stems from two issues. Firstly, the impacts of climate change are sensitive not only 1 
to mean temperature changes but also to changes in precipitation, to the probability distribution of 2 
potential future climates (e.g. fat tails), to the rate of change, and to variance (e.g. extreme events) 3 
(Stern, 2013). Secondly, the effects of climate change will often interact in a synergistic rather than 4 
additive way with the presence of other (unevenly geographically distributed) stressors such as 5 
poverty (Carter et al., 2007). Setting under-estimation aside, there are major questions about the 6 
precision of such context-insensitive estimates. For example, the impacts of climate change will be 7 
moderated and mediated by a range of spatially variable mechanisms and dimensions of context 8 
that simply cannot be captured within aggregated models that are calibrated with respect to a 9 
“patchy” understanding of local impacts. Finally, global-scale impact assessments have typically not 10 
taken account of the effect of future changes in socio-economic conditions in moderating the 11 
impacts of climate change (Parry, 2004; Arnell et al., 2004). This matters because recent analyses 12 
suggest that these dimensions of context are often more significant than the degree of climate 13 
change itself in shaping the extent and distribution of impacts (ibid.). In short, climate change is a 14 
multi-dimensional causal capacity whose impacts are moderated and mediated by a range of 15 
spatially variable dimensions of context. Galilean idealisation is problematic. 16 
We now turn away from formal modelling of climate change to focus briefly on policy discourses and 17 
practices. In the formative years of the climate debate policy-makers, academics, NGOs, and media 18 
repeatedly emphasised not only the inextricably global nature of climate change – in the sense that 19 
emissions are globally dispersed, and impacts similarly spread across the globe – but also the global 20 
and abstract nature of the underlying causes (Adger et al., 2001). The dominant discourse portrayed 21 
climate change as stemming from an externality or “market failure,” that is, the failure to include the 22 
costs of carbon emissions within the price of energy production and consumption (Adger et al., 23 
2001; Ostrom, 2009; Stern, 2006).  Under this way of thinking, the natural solution was to develop 24 
technologies that place the true costs of carbon inside the market and so reduce emissions (e.g. cap 25 
and trade, etc.). Moreover, given the framing of climate change as a problem of collective action 26 
whose impacts are independent of the source of externality, the main locus of action has been the 27 
transnational level (Wiener, 2007; Stern, 2006). The aim of these governance technologies was to 28 
control the planetary climate system – with the global thermostat the key metaphor (Hulme, 2010) – 29 
with policy goals centred on keeping temperature rises within certain manageable bounds (e.g. 2 30 
degrees Centigrade of pre-industrial temperatures; Hulme, 2010; Stern, 2008). Amidst growing 31 
concerns about the political realities of implementing carbon trading and related programmes, a 32 
renewed focus on geo-engineering – the technological manipulation of the planetary environment – 33 
emerged and began to lead to experimental projects (Macnaghten and Owen, 2011).  34 
3.2. Implications of the place-less framing of climate change for policy and public understanding 35 
These efforts to characterise and tackle climate change in many ways reflected an extension of the 36 
modernist vision of mastering nature, namely a reliance on: technologies with a global reach; 37 
technocratic institutions for knowledge making and policy advice (e.g. the IPCC); relatively a-spatial 38 
forms of physical science; and a global calculus of costs and benefits. However, these “globalising 39 
instincts” (Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2010) ran into difficulties. Political agreements so far have been 40 
partial and tentative, publics remain largely disengaged and in some cases rather polarised, and 41 
greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric levels continue to rise (Sarewitz, 2004, 2010; Hulme, 42 
2008). These difficulties are partly rooted in the relative neglect of place that is characteristic of 43 
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modernist commitments. In relying heavily on a-spatial and idealised GCMs and IAMs – and 1 
focussing on harms that are easily expressed in economic terms (Adger et al., 2011) – early climate 2 
change science was unable to represent the heterogeneity of climatic shifts and associated impacts 3 
(Liu et al., 2013b); systematically underestimated the likely magnitude of economic damages; 4 
downplayed the importance of local knowledge in adaptation planning (e.g. indigenous knowledge; 5 
Hulme, 2011); and neglected humanistic accounts of the contextually bound consequences of 6 
changing climates (e.g. threats to sense of place; Adger et al., 2011). These limitations have had 7 
many tangible implications, most obviously in constraining adaptation planning and providing 8 
inadequate guidance on the scale and character of the threat. Other implications are more subtle, 9 
for example critics claim that the “scientism” pervading elite discourses on climate change (Wynne, 10 
2010; Shackley and Wynne, 1996; Hulme, 2008) has encouraged actors on both sides of the science-11 
policy divide to overstate and oversimplify the state of knowledge on the issue (Prins et al., 2010), 12 
leading in part to intense political polarisation. A further problem is that the global, abstract framing 13 
has meant that the idea of climate change lacks traction and meaning for many publics (Adger et al., 14 
2011; Hulme, 2008). It is often viewed by laypeople as a “psychologically distant” phenomenon that 15 
will affect future generations in an abstract space (Spence et al., 2012), and whose underlying causes 16 
are not concrete choices or behaviours enacted in particular places, but instead systems such as 17 
technology, capitalism, and political institutions (Hinchliffe, 1996; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; 18 
Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Wolf and Moser, 2011; McDaniels et al., 1996). This may partially explain the 19 
value-action gap on climate change. In a potentially self-fulfilling feedback, much climate impact 20 
analysis treats societies as fairly passive and homogenous recipients of the impacts of climate 21 
change (mimicking the modernist view of governable populations; Foucault, 1991; Scott, 1998), 22 
rather than as composed of people who will react to both the anticipation and manifestation of 23 
climate change in complex and diverse ways (Oppenheimer, 2013). 24 
3.3. Shifts towards a spatially explicit approach to climate change science 25 
In this section we sketch out recent shifts away from abstract, global, universal framings of climate 26 
change, towards more spatially explicit accounts of how climate change is driven and will exert its 27 
effects. One manifestation of this is the upsurge in social science and humanistic research on the 28 
causes and impacts climate change, much of which is explicitly context sensitive. For example, 29 
researchers have explored how climate-change-related risks to place attachment, cultural 30 
landscapes, and sense of identity might be valued (e.g. Adger et al., 2011; Brace and Geoghegan, 31 
2010), how structural features of local environments interact with norms and expectations to 32 
produce energy consumption habits (e.g. Shove, 2010), and how plural (rather than homogenous) 33 
worldviews, beliefs and value systems shape societal capacities to respond (Adger et al., 2009). 34 
Vulnerability analysis is another area of research sensitive to the geographical dimensions of climate 35 
impacts and responses (Ford, 2012) that is gaining increased attention. The three classic dimensions 36 
of vulnerability analysis (Clark et al., 2000) are place-sensitive: exposure (e.g. communities living in 37 
coastal areas are particularly exposed, given changes in storm tracks), sensitivity (people in areas 38 
where economies are tightly linked to the production of climate-sensitive goods are particularly 39 
sensitive), and coping capacity (wealth, social capital, etc. are spatially clustered). Vulnerability 40 
concepts have a long tradition within human geography and indeed within the climate change 41 
literature. However, the operationalization of these concepts is now more credible and salient owing 42 
to the increasingly spatially explicit, place-sensitive approaches to climate change science and 43 
impact modelling. For example, many of the meso-scale physical phenomena that act as bridges 44 
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between global climate systems and regional climate patterns – such as the monsoon, the El Niño-1 
Southern Oscillation, tropical cyclones – are increasingly well simulated within climate models 2 
(Christensen et al., 2013). The same is also true of the representation of micro-scale processes such 3 
as soil moisture and snow albedo – now known to play important roles in modulating local and 4 
regional responses to macro scale shifts in atmospheric processes (Diffenbaugh et al., 2005; Flato et 5 
al., 2013). Model performance has also been improved by enhancing the resolution of various 6 
stationary geographical features such as topography and coastlines (Flato et al., 2013).  7 
These aforementioned advances, together with developments in statistical downscaling mean that 8 
the spatial pattering of future climates is now forecast with a significantly improved level of 9 
resolution and accuracy (Flato et al., 2013). As such, the long-standing scalar mismatch between 10 
climate science and the needs of the climate impact modelling community and adaptation planners 11 
is now partially bridged. One example of this is the Hadley Centre’s PRECIS model, which has 12 
informed adaptation planning across the developing world (Mahony and Hulme, 2011).  An 13 
interesting feature of PRECIS is that it was designed with a degree of “plasticity” (Mahony and 14 
Hulme, 2011), meaning that local modelling teams were able to recalibrate the model to reflect the 15 
environmental conditions of their own particular places (e.g. by adjusting parameterisations). 16 
Advances in impacts modelling from AR3 onwards are similarly congenial to the mechanism-context 17 
ontology, such as the growing use of mechanistic (rather than correlational) models that often have 18 
geographically explicit representations (Ahmad et al., 2001). Taken together, these developments 19 
reflect the idea that a great deal of knowledge of local conditions is often required to cash out the 20 
implications of relatively general mechanisms, such as those that govern climate. For example, 21 
downscaling techniques combined with ecological models have allowed for the identification of 22 
refugia – sites where animals can survive in spite of unfavourable local or regional climates – and so 23 
correct for what may have been previously biased estimates of threats to biodiversity and also 24 
provide the level of granularity required for designing policy interventions such as the orientation of 25 
movement corridors (Ashcroft et al., 2009; Ackerly et al., 2010). An Aristotelian ontology is also 26 
reflected in recent efforts to explicitly model the potentially synergistic interactions between various 27 
dimensions of climate impacts (see Oppenheimer et al., 2014), often with a rather localised focus. 28 
For example, in tropical regions the combined potential consequences of the loss of pollinators, 29 
increased risk of pest outbreaks, and stresses on water supply systems may lead to declines in food 30 
production that are significantly higher than the addition of their individual effects would suggest 31 
(Stern, 2006), making Galilean idealisation problematic.  32 
The overall message of this section is that even where causal drivers are global in nature (e.g. 33 
atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases), their impacts are often a) mediated through variables that 34 
are spatially clustered at multiple scales, b) moderated by contextual features of the local 35 
environment, and c) interact with the presence of other (localised) stressors in synergistic rather 36 
than additive ways. In such situations, Galilean idealisation is not a reliable strategy for estimating 37 
causal effects. The methods of climate science are evolving in ways that acknowledge this 38 
perspective. 39 
3.4. Shifts towards the spatialisation of climate change mitigation 40 
Perhaps less obviously, the climate mitigation agenda has also begun to connect with place, by 41 
emphasising spatial planning and local autonomy, appealing to heterogeneous worldviews and 42 
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interests, and adopting policy experiments across multiple scales and locations. One manifestation 1 
of this is a partial shift away from elite discourses that focussed on global and structural drivers of 2 
climate change, towards ones that emphasise its local, contingent, and by extension more readily 3 
manipulable causes (e.g. Behavioural Insights Team, 2010; Seto et al., 2014). This emphasis on how 4 
local norms and practices drive emissions, and how structural features of the local environment 5 
constrain or shape mitigation opportunities, is congenial to the view that human behaviour and 6 
social life is heterogeneous and context-dependent (rather than law-like). In principle, such a 7 
framing may help to redefine how local planners, policy-makers, and publics conceive of the 8 
mechanics of the climate problem in a way that enhances agency.  9 
A case in point of the above is the behaviour change agenda, which focuses on connecting carbon 10 
emissions with actions and behaviours at relatively localised scales (Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Burgess 11 
and Nye, 2008), for example through associating carbon footprint with choice-sets that crop up in 12 
everyday life (e.g. kg of CO2 produced for alternative transport modes; Walker and King, 2008), and 13 
deploying local CO2 monitoring systems integrated with feedback and incentives. However, 14 
behaviour change approaches have been critiqued for neglecting how structural features of the local 15 
environment constrain and condition human behaviour (Shove, 2010). Recent efforts to embed 16 
climate mitigation within the objective function of urban spatial planning reflect this line of thought. 17 
They take concrete form in strategies that seek to reduce sprawl and automobile dependence (e.g. 18 
“new urbanism”), and in efforts to protect the carbon sequestration capacities of peri-urban areas 19 
(Seto et al., 2014). Cutting across these two approaches is a proliferation of research on “co-20 
benefits,” which refers to both the side benefits of mitigation actions in other policy domains, and 21 
vice versa (see Somanathan et al., 2014). Some of these co-benefits sit at the macro or meso-level 22 
(e.g. technology spillover and energy security), but many of them are tied to more local political or 23 
economic interests and even to the values and concerns that drive people’s everyday choices and 24 
practices (e.g. air pollution, water quality, and energy costs; Whitmarsh, 2009; Seto et al., 2014). In 25 
theory, identifying and exploiting co-benefits should help to overcome the collective action 26 
problems (Ostrom, 2009) thought to constrain local, uncoordinated mitigation attempts. It may also 27 
ensure that potential climate mitigation practices and low emission transitions are congenial to a 28 
heterogeneous range of cultural and ideological outlooks, in contrast to the rather polarising current 29 
state of affairs (c.f. Kahan, 2010).  30 
The above analysis is indicative of a broader post-AR4 spatialisation of climate mitigation policy. In 31 
particular, recent years have seen a substantial increase in regional, national, and sub-national 32 
policies and institutions targeted at emissions reduction, which is not well explained under the 33 
standard collective action theory (Somanathan et al., 2014). This reflects a partial shift towards poly-34 
centric approaches to climate governance (Ostrom, 2009), consisting of a series of experiments with 35 
diverse climate mitigation strategies across different scales, often integrated in formal networks, and 36 
typically tailored to the contexts of specific geographic locales (Rayner and Malone, 1997; Folke et 37 
al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014; Somanathan et al., 2014). This variant of “muddling through” – which sits 38 
in stark contrast to the purposive rationality favoured by modernist approaches – may help to clarify 39 
which instruments and approaches to climate mitigation stake a greater claim to efficiency and 40 
effectiveness, and how these are dependent on scale and on place. Regarding scale, one idea 41 
beginning to feature in the climate mitigation literature is fiscal federalism (e.g. Somanathan et al., 42 
2014), which is the principle that responsibility for public policy making should be allocated to the 43 
scale best equipped to handle it (e.g. local authorities may have both the technical capacity and the 44 
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incentives to reduce emissions from waste transport, given the relatively localised co-benefits). In 1 
relation to place, one of Ostrom’s key insights was that the emergence of co-operation (on climate 2 
actions) is strongly shaped by dimensions of the social contexts within which people are rooted and 3 
where they experience environmental problems (e.g. norms, networks, social cohesion; Lejano and 4 
de Castro, 2014). This contrasts with the earlier focus on generic consumption practices (e.g. air-5 
travel), where there was a tendency to lose sight of the fact that the possibilities and potentials for 6 
decarbonisation will vary greatly from place to place (Kates and Wilbanks, 2003), as will the 7 
transformations in broader structural and institutional mechanisms that may be needed to make 8 
them workable (Chapin et al., 2010).  9 
Conclusions 10 
Galilean accounts portray knowledge of the social and environmental world as fundamentally 11 
placeless; as universal, general, and transcendent, rather than parochial, contingent or particular. To 12 
show knowledge as placed – as either restricted in scope or shaped by context – has often been 13 
synonymous with critique or deconstruction (Ophir and Shapin, 1991). Here, however, we developed 14 
an account of place whose point of departure is that science is concerned with causal processes and 15 
their interaction with context, rather than with a search for laws. It draws on an ontology which 16 
views the structure, scope, and effects of causal processes as depending crucially on the settings in 17 
which they are embedded. On this account, contingency, spatial variation, and heterogeneity are 18 
central features of scientific enquiry, rather than nuisances to be adjusted for or averaged out. We 19 
used this conceptual framework to critically analyse the relative place-neglect that characterised the 20 
early stages of climate science and governance – implicating it in the failure to make meaningful 21 
progress on emissions reductions – before tracing out recent shifts towards more spatially explicit 22 
approaches that promise greater salience and credibility for publics and decision-makers at multiple 23 
scales. Our basic claim is that a fundamental focus on context, heterogeneity, and spatial variation 24 
need not diminish the policy relevance of social and environmental science, but rather may enhance 25 
it. Global sustainability problems are fundamentally placed, in the sense that they are the products 26 
of diverse actions that are highly contextual, exert impacts through causal chains that are spatially 27 
variable, interact synergistically with other localised stressors, and generate heterogeneous 28 
responses from publics and other actors. Both the methods of science and the practices of policy-29 
making need to be sensitive to this in order to develop robust, evidence-based, and effective 30 
sustainability governance. 31 
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